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LITTLE BLUE N.R.D. v. LOWER PLATTE NORTH N.R.D.
Neb., 317 N.W.2d 726
• Heard before ICRIVOSHA, C. Le and
B4SLAUGH, AlcCOVT14, cubrrox,
BRoDgEr, WHITS; end HASTINGS.
KRIV06111, Cada Justice.
pacable, its provisions were satisfied, we
The appellants, who are various Nebraska need not address any of the other errors
municipalities, natural resources districts, a assigned.
conservation district, and several environIn 1973 the Congress of the United States
mental organizations, have appealed from enacted the Endangered Species Act of
an order entered by the director of the 1978. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq. (1976 &
Department of Water Resources (Depart- Supp. 111 1979). Under the provisions of
ment) which in substance granted to the the federal Endangered Species Act, states
appellee, Little Blue Natural Resources Dis- were required to peas similar endangered
trict (Little Blue), the authority to appro- species legislation in order to continue repriate, under conditions prescribed in the ceiving certain federal funds. As a result,
order, waters of the North Platte River for in 1975 the Nebraska Legislature adopted
a proposed irrigation project to be con- the above-cited Act 1975 Neb.Laws, LB.
structed by Little Blue. For reasons which 145.
we will set out in greater detail, We find
The purpose of the Act is spelled out in
that we must reverse the order of the De- § 37-432,
provides in part: "The
partment's director and remand the matter Legislaturewhich
finds
and
... (2) That
back to the director for further proceedings species of wildlife and declares:
wild
plants
normally
in accordance with this opinion.
occurring within this state which may be
This is the second appearance of this mat- found to be threatened or endangered withter before this court. The facts are fully in this state-shall be accorded such protecset out in our first opinion at 21:18 Neb. 585, tion as is necessary to maintain and en294 N.W2d 598 (1980) (Little Blue I), and hance their numbers." The pertinent porwill not be repeated herein. The effect of tion of the Act, which is found in § 87ow order in Little Blue I was to require the 435(8), reads as follows: "The Governor
director to determine whether the taking of shall review other programs administered
the water contemplated by Little Blue for by him and utilize such programs in furits proposed project should be denied be- therance of the purposes of sections 87-430
muse such denial was demanded by the to 37-438. All other state departments and
public interest, as requited by Neb.Const agencies shall, in consultation with and
art. XV, § 6. Following our decision in with the assistance of the commission, utiLittle Blue I, the director instructed all the lize their authorities in furtherance of the
interested parties to prepare and submit purposes of sections 87-480 to 27-438 by
briefs to him addressing only the issue of carrying out programs for the conservation
"public interest" as it pertains to the pro- of endangered species and threatened speposal of Little Blue. No further hearings cies listed pursuant to section 37-434, and
were held by the director and no further by taking such action necessary to insure
testimony taken, though thy appellants re- that actions authonsed, funded, CC carried
quested the opportunity to present addition- out by them do not jeopardize the continued
al evidence to the director.
existence of such endangered or threatened
A number of errors are assigned by ap- species or result in the destruction or modipellants. Before we turn to those matters, fication of habitat of such species which is
however, it is necessary that we first ad- determined by the COMITISIOD to be critdress a threshold question, not required to ical." (Emphasis supplied.) The commisbe addreesed by us in Little Blue I, concern- sion referred to in the Act is defined by
ing the significance of the provisions of statute as the Nebraska Game and Parks
Neb.ltev.Stat §§ 87-490 to 87-488 (Reissue Commission. See §87-431(2). Pursuant
1978) and cited as The Nongame and En- to the federal Endangered Species Act and
dangered Species Conservation Act (Act). the state Act, certain species have been
Unless we determine that the Act has no declared to be endangered species, including
application to the instant project or, if ap- the whooping crane and the bald eagle,

for that finding and the director's attempt
to balance interests is made clear from the
order. Nor can one determine what the
• effect of this project will be on the habitat
of the endangered species involved by examining the voluminous record in this case.
We are simply unable to determine from
the record in its present state whether the
proposed project will in fact jeopardize the
continued existence of such endangered or
threatened species or result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species, contrary to the prohibitions contained
in § 37-435(3). There is some evidence in
the record to indicate that the habitats may
be affected by the project The extent of
that effect and how it applies when exam[1,2] There is no question but that the ined in light of the Act is not shown so that
Department of Water Resources is a de- we can determine if the Act is being violatpartment or agency within the meaning of ed. What is clear, however, is that the
§ 37-435(3). Neb.Rev.Stat. § 46-705 (Reis- examination that has been made by both
sue 1978). Furthermore, Little Blue, as a the Department and Little Blue is inadecreature of statute and a political subdivi- quate, and further evidence is required.
We should note at this point that the
sion, is also an agency within the meaning
of § 37-485(3) and bound by its provisions. provisions of the Act may not repeal the
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 2-3213(1) (Cum.Supp. provisions of Neb.Const art. XV, §§ 4, 5,
1980). Schlientz v. City of North Platte, and 6. To the extent that the prohibition
172 Neb. 477, 110 N.W.2d 68 (1961); Vap v. contained in the Act denied to a citizen of
City of McCook, 178 Neb. 844, 136 N.W.2d the State of Nebraska a right otherwise
220 (1965); Seward County Rural Fire Pro- guaranteed to the citizen, the Act would
tection Dist. v. County of Seward, 156 Neb. have to give way. That issue is not before
516, 56 N.W2d 700 (1953). Likewise, it us at this time and we do not consider what
seems clear beyond question that the devel- conflicts between the Act and the Constituopment of the irrigation project by Little tion of Nebraska may arise. Absent a conBlue and the issuance of a permit by the stitutional conflict, however, the requireDepartment to Little Blue both qualify as ments imposed upon a state agency by the
"action" taken by a state agency and, there- Act, as presently enacted, are rather clear
fore, may not jeopardize the continued ex- and may not be either ignored or waived.
istence of the endangered species or result
The relevant section of the state Act is,
in the destruction or modification of their for all practical purposes, identical with the
habitat.
federal act on the same 'subject, and there[3] The director, in his order issued fol- fore the decisions of the federal courts,
lowing our remand in Little Blue I, found, including the U. S. Supreme Court, in interamong other matters: "The potential af- preting the federal act are of great help to
fects [sic] to [fish and wildlife habitat] ei- us in deciding this case. The U. S. Supreme
ther are deemed minimal or would be miti- Court in its decision in TVA v. Hill, 487
gated by offsetting or even enhancing cir- U.S. 153, 98 S.Ct. 2179, 57 L.E42d 117
cumstances derived from operation of the. (1978), put to rest any doubt as to how the
proposed project" (Emphasis supplied.) act is to be applied. The issue in the WA
Neither the meaning of that finding in light case was whether the Tennessee Valley Auof the restrictions of the Act nor the basis thority could complete the construction of
both of whom either roost upon or in some
manna use the Platte River area as a habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1980); Neb. Game
and Parks Comm. Wildlife Reg. 9-4(a)
(1981). There may be others.
The Act imposes two obligations on all
state departments and agencies. One is
that all state departments and agencies
must, after consulting with Game and
Parks, carry out programs for the conservation of endangered species, and (2) all state
departments and agencies must net take
any action that will result in jeopardizing
the continued existence of endangered or
threatened species or result ip the destruction or modification of a habitat of such
species. § 37-435(3).
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the tSlico Dam on 'the Little Tennessee
River once it was determined that the aitbuil habitat of the snail darter would be
totally eliminated by completion of the
dam. At the time that the snail darter's
existence near the Smite was first determined, millions of dollars had already been
spent on the dam's construction, which WM
nearly completed. In enjoining the completion of the dam, the .U. S. Supreme Court
said at 17$: "One would be hard pressed to
finds statutory provision whose terms were
any plainer than those in 47 of the Endangered Species Act Its very words affirmstively command all -federal agencies 'to inewe that actions authorised, funded, or
carried out by them do not jeopardise the
continued existence' of an endangered species or 'result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species ....' 16
U.S.C. 6 1586 (1976 ed.). (Emphasis added.) This language admits of no exception." Section 7 of the federal act is almost
identical with § 37-435(3) of the state Act
The U. S. Supreme Court concluded that
the history of the act dearly required the
courts to follow the mandates of the legislation, regardless of what the courts might
think. The Court said at 179-80, 98 &Ct. at
2294: "In shaping legislation to deal with
the problem thus presented, Congress started from the finding that '[t]he two major
causes of extinction are hunting and destruction of natural habitat' S.Rep.No.93807, p. 2 (1973). Of these twin threats,
Congress was informed that the greatest
was destruction of natural habitats; see
1973 House Hearings 286 (statement of Associate Deputy Chief for National Forest
System, Dept of Agriculture); id., at 241
(statement of Director of Mich. Dept of
Natural Resources); id, at 906 (statement
of Stephen R. Seater, Defenders of Wildlife); lechenmeier, The Endangered Spades Act of 1973: Preservation or Pandemonium?, -5 Environ. Law 29, 31 (1974). Witnesse, recommended, among other things,
that -Congress require all land-managing
*geodes 'to avoid damaging critical habitat
for endangered species and to take -positive
steps to improve such habitat.' 1973 House
Hearings 261 (statement of Director cif

Nit Dept of Natural Resources). Virtuilly every bill Introduced in Congress during the 1973 session responded to this con,
corn by incorporating language similar, if
not identical, to that found in the present
§ '7 of the Act nose provisions were designed, in the words of an administration
witness, 'for the first time [to] prohibit [a]
--federal agency from taking action which
does jeopardize the status of endangered
species,' Hearings on S. 1592 and S. 1983
before the Subcommittee on Environment
of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d
Cong., 1st Sees., 68 (1973) (statement of
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interibr)
(emphasis added); furthermore, the meposed bills would 'dimwit) all ... Federal
agencies to utilize their authorities for
carrying out programs for the protection of
endangered animals.' 1973 House Hearings
205 (statement of Assistant Secretary of
the Interior). (Emphasis added.)
"As it was finally passed, the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 represented the most
comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by
any nation. Its stated purposes were 'to
provide a means whereby the ecosystems
upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved,' and
'to provide a program for the conservation
of such
. species ...
16 USX.
§ 1531(3) (1976 ed.). In furtherance of
these goals, Congress expressly stated in
§ 2(c) that 'all Federal departments and
agencies shall seek to conserve endangered
species and threatened species ....' 16
U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1976 ed.). (Emphasis added.) List there be any ambiguity as to the
meaning of this statutory directive, the Act
specifically defined 'conserve' as meaning
'to we and the use of all methods sad
procedures which are necessary to king
any endangered species or threatens(' modes to the point at which the measures
provided pursuant to this chapter are no
longer necessary.'"
17*--U. S. Supreme Court went on to
make further comment Concerning the sew
Der in *bill the set is to be etielialeeered,
say* et 128-84, 8.0t. at Slit "While
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the Conference Report made no specific reference to this choice of provisions, the
House manager of the bill, Representative
Dingell, provided an interpretation of what
the Conference bill would require, making
it clear that the mandatory provisions of
§ 7 were not casually or inadvertently included:
'[Section 7] substantially amplifie[s] the
obligation of [federal agencies] to take
steps within their power to carry out the
purposes of this act A recent article ...
illustrates the problem which might occur
absent this new language in the bill. It
appears that the whooping cranes of this
country, perhaps the best known of our
endangered species, are being threatened by
Air Force bombing activities along the gulf
coast of Texas. Under existing law, the
Secretary of Defense has some discretion as
to whether or not he will take the neassavry
action to see that this threat disappears
. . [O]nce the bill is enacted, [the Satretary of Defense] would be required to take
the proper steps. . .
"'. . . [T]he agencies of Government can
no longer plead that they can do nothing
about it. They can, and they must. The
law is clear.'"

In recognizing that the Court was required to follow the dictates of the legislation and not view the matter as merely de
minimis, the U. S. Supreme Court said at
187-88: "One might dispute the applicability of these examples to the Tellico Dam by
saying that in this case the burden on the
public through the loss of millions of unrecoverable dollars would greatly outweigh
the loss of the snail darter. But neither the
Endangered Species Act nor Art. III of the
Constitution provides federal courts with
authority to make such fine utilitarian calculations. On the contrary, the plain language of the Act, buttressed by its legislative history, shows clearly that Congress
viewed the value of endangered species as
'incalculable.' Quite obviously, it would be
difficult for a court to balance the loss of a
sum certain—even $100 million—against a
congressionally declared 'incalculable' value,
even assuming we had the power to engage
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In such a weighing process, which we emphatically do not"
Just as the U. S. Supreme Court was
without choice when examining the effect
of the federal Endangered Species Act and
balancing it against the benefits of the
nearly completed Tellico Dam, likewise, this
court is without choice, in examining the
effect of the state Act, to engage in such
balancing. The requirements of the Act
are absolute and must be met. That there
may be offsetting or even enhancing circumstances derived from the operation of
the project may be insufficient if the endangered species habitat is destroyed, as
the Act now stands.
[4] No action of a state department or
agency nor program administered by the
Governor can be permitted as long as
§ 37-435(3) is in effect until the interested
parties have consulted with Game and
Parks and have determined that the action
contemplated will not jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered species or
result in destruction or modification of habitat of such species.
We pause at this point to clearly point
out that we do not, by our action today,
determine that the project does indeed violate the Act We merely decide as we do
because the record before us fails to disclose
that the Department and Little Blue adequately consulted with and sought the assistance of Game and Parks in planning the
project, and for the further reason that the
record before UB fails to disclose that the
actions contemplated by both Little Blue, in
constructing its projeet, and the Department, in authorizing the project, will not
"jeopardize the continued existence of such
endangered or threatened species or result
in the destruction or modification of habitat
of such species which is determined by the
commission to be critical." Until the record
contains sufficient evidence upon which
such determination can be made, in the first
instance by the director, and if necessary on
appeal by this court, the project must be
halted and the cause remanded for further
proceedings.

[5] In view of our action herein, we
believe it advisable to comment on what is
meant when the Act requires the parties to
"consult" with the commission. The consultation required by the Act does not grant to
Caine and Parks absolute veto. In National
Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d
359, 371 (5th Cir. 1976), the court said:
"Federal agencies are required to consult
and obtain the assistance of the Secretary
before taking any actions which may affect
endangered species or critical habitat.
However, once an agency has had meaningful consultation with the Secretary of Interior concerning actions which may affect an
endangered species the final decision of
whether or not to proceed with the action
lies with the agency itself. Section 7 does
not give the Department of Interior a veto
over the actions of other federal agencies,
provided that the required consultation has
occurred." (Emphasis supplied.) See, also,
Sierra Club v. Frothlice, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th
Cir. 1976).
While Game and Parks, therefore, does
not have absolute veto, it is clear from the
Act that meaningful consultation is an absolute prerequisite to proceeding with any
project. Moreover, because the commission
does not have power of veto does not mean
that either the Department or Little Blue
can ignore the effect of the project on the
endangered species if in fact the evidence
supports that conclusion.
IA National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, supra at 373, the court further noted:

"In holding that the appellees have 'adequately considered' the effects of the highway on the crane, the district court misconstrued the dinsctive of § 7. As we have
pointed out, § 7 imposes on all federal
agencies the mandatory obligation to insure
that any action authorized, funded, or
carried out by them does not jeopardize the
existence of an endangered species or destroy critical habitat of such species ....
Although the FEIS and the administrative
record indicates that the appellees have recognized and considered the danger the highway poses to the crane, they have failed to
take the necessary steps 'to insure' that the
highway will not jeopardize the crane or

—
modify its habitat" The court therefore
enjoined the project and directed that the
Department of Interior take a closer look at
what effect, if any, construction of a highway upon the habitat of the crane would
have.
The court further noted in Coleman that
if the agency disregarded the evidence, the
court would be required to review the matter, saying at 371-72: "It follows that after
consulting with the Secretary the federal
agency involved must determine whether it
has taken all necessary action to insure that
its actions will not jeopardize the continued
existence of an endangered species or destroy or modify habitat critical to the existence of the species. Once that decision is
made it is then subject to judicial review to
ascertain whether 'the decision was based
on a consideration of the relevant factors
and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment.' Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, supra, 401 U.S. [402] at
416, 91 S.Ct [814] at 824, 23 L.Ed.2d [136]
at 153. See Title 16, U.S.C., Section
1540(X)."
In view of the fact that we are remanding this matter back to the director for
further proceedings, we deem it appropriate
to comment on one further matter. Since
our decision in Little Blue I, the Legislature
of the State of Nebraska has amended the
provisions of Neb.Rev.Stat §§ 46-204, 46206, 46-234, and 46-235 (Supp.1981), all relating to transbasin diversion. 1981 Neb.
Laws, LB. 252. In particular, the Legislature has amended § 46-235 to provide that
certain criteria are to be considered by the
director in determining whether the public
interest as required by the Constitution is
met. Neb.Const art. XV, § 6.
[6] The substantive right to divert the
water unless the public interest demands
otherwise is found in the Constitution and
cannot be denied by statute. Neb.Const
art. XV, § 6; Little Blue N.RD. v. Lower
Platte North N.RD., 206 Neb. 535, 294
N.W2d 598 (1980). The function of Neb.
Rev.Stat § 46-289 (Supp.1981) is to establish in part the procedure to be followed by
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the director in attempting to determine
whether a denial of the application is demanded by the public interest. As such,
§ 46-289 is a procedural law and not a
substantive law, and is to be applied to
hearingit held after the passage of the Act
even though the application was filed prior
to the passage of the procedural law. • See,
Romano v. B. B. Greenberg Co., 108 R.I.
182, 273 A.2d $15 (1971); Schultz v. Gomelink, 260 Iowa 115, 148 N.W2d 484 (1967).
[7] In 2 AmaTur2d Administrative Lam

6 826 at 149 (1962), it provides in part: "An
administrative agency is required to act under the law as it stands when its order is
entered. A change of law pending an administrative determination must be followed and the new law applied, at least in
relation to permits for the doing of future
acts, unless the statute contains a saving
clause."
And in Oviatt v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hospital, 191 Neb. 224, 236,214 N.W2d
490, 492 (1974), we said: "[A]mendments to
statutes which ire procedural in nature are
applicable to pending cases which have not
been tried." See, also, Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 318 U.S. 73,68 S.Ct. 465,87 L.Ed.
621 (1943).
We believe that, upon remand, further
hearings should be held by the director and
relevant evidence should be adduced Sating particularly to those factors set forth in
§ 46-285 as now amended, as well as the
project's effect upon the endangered species. In so holding we do not pass upon the
validity of § 46-285. The action of the director is therefore
reversed and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH
DIRECTIONS.
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